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A Bitter Pill? Institutional Corruption and the Challenge of Anti-bribery Compliance in 
the Pharmaceutical Sector 
 
Elizabeth David-Barrett1, Basak Yakis-Douglas2,3, Amanda Moss-Cowan4, and Yen 
Nguyen5 
Abstract 
We investigate why top-down directives aimed at eradicating corruption are ineffective at 
altering on-the-ground practices for organizations that have adopted industry-wide “gold 
standards” to prevent bribery and corruption. Using interview and focus group data collected 
from leading multinational pharmaceutical firms, we unearth antecedents contributing to 
organizations’ systemic failure to embed their anticorruption policies in business practice. 
We identify two tensions that contribute to this disconnect: a culture clash between global 
and local norms, especially in emerging markets and a similar disconnect between the 
compliance and commercial functions. To overcome these tensions, we suggest that 
organizations are likely to find it easier to implement a no gifts policy if they cease to rely on 
local agents embedded in local norms and that there needs to be strong evidence of board-
level commitment to antibribery programs, innovative ways of incentivizing compliant 
behavior, and a fundamental rethinking of organizations’ business model and remuneration 
practices. 
 
Keywords: deviant/counterproductive behavior, corruption, emerging markets, ethics, 






Companies doing business internationally face a number of political and legal risks that do 
not occur when they do business domestically. Among these, risks associated with bribery 
and corruption have gained prominence in recent years owing to increasingly proactive 
enforcement of anti-bribery laws, i.e., laws that prohibit the payment of bribes to foreign 
public officials (Koehler, 2011), in many jurisdictions. While the US Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act (FCPA) was introduced in 1977, it has only been aggressively enforced since 
other major exporting nations - OECD members - committed themselves to similar self-
restraint twenty years later in the form of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention (Koehler, 
2012; Pieth, Low, and Cullen, 2007). As a whole, these laws constrain a large swathe of 
international business activity, not least because they have considerable extra-territorial 
reach. Most international companies have subsidiaries in the United Kingdom or United 
States and therefore have to comply with either the FCPA or the UK Bribery Act (Jing and 
Graham, 2008). Moreover, the definition of a bribe in these laws as “anything of value” poses 
a threat to a number of business practices relating to gifts and hospitality that are considered 
the norm in many countries (Jing and Graham, 2008; Sanyal, 2005). 
It is not surprising then that the pharmaceutical sector has faced a number of 
enforcement actions relating to violations of anti-bribery laws, often for practices related to 
the provision of gifts, entertainment and hospitality to physicians. The TRACE International 
Compendium, a database of international anti-bribery enforcement actions, records 59 cases 
relating to companies in the pharmaceutical/healthcare/medical devices sector, of which 21 
relate to the provision of gifts and hospitality, for which companies received either lucrative 
contracts or a significant increase in prescriptions in returni. The US authorities have also 
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focused their attentions on this sector in recent years: in 2009, US assistant attorney general 
Lanny Breuer gave a speech to the Pharmaceutical Regulatory and Compliance Congress 
annual forum in Washington, warning that FCPA violations in pharmaceutical companies 
would be a new focus for his department.1 Pharmaceutical companies also face pressure to 
disclose payments made to physicians from another new US law, the Physician Payments 
Sunshine Act. This requires companies supplying federal healthcare programs to disclose all 
financial relationships with physicians and teaching hospitals to the Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services (CMS), which in turn publishes it online.2  The aim is to allow civil 
society groups or individuals to uncover potential conflicts of interest, whereby a physician 
might be over-prescribing or advocating the use of a drug whilst receiving an income from its 
manufacturer. The law has shone a further spotlight on the relatively common sectoral 
practice of pharmaceutical companies making payments to physicians, prompting many 
compliance departments to clamp down on practices that used to be commonplace.   
The proliferation of anti-bribery laws and the more serious approach towards their 
enforcement have created risks for companies with certain characteristics – and many of 
these factors are pertinent to the pharmaceutical sector.  First, companies that have multiple 
interactions with foreign governments in the course of their business are at risk because the 
laws prohibit bribes to ‘foreign public officials’.  Pharmaceutical companies interact with 
governments as regulators (e.g., agencies that monitor drug safety), as clients (e.g., state 
hospitals or healthcare trusts), and as distributors to end-users (e.g., physicians who prescribe 
drugs to patients).  The number and character of interfaces with the state vary considerably 
from country to country, but they are always significant and there is frequently scope for state 
officials to exercise discretion, which means that they are potential targets of influence. 
                                                        
1
 Quoted here: http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2009/11/13/breuer-sends-fcpa-warning-to-big-pharma-and-its-
executives/ 
2
 Data is available here: openpaymentsdata.cms.gov 
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Second, companies that rely heavily on third parties and agents are at risk, since these 
laws make them liable for bribes paid by such actors on their behalf; and yet, such third 
parties may be difficult to monitor and control.  Again, this often applies to pharmaceutical 
companies, who tend to rely on local distributors.  Indeed, physicians might in some contexts 
be regarded as agents, since they play an intermediary role between the seller and the user.  
Third, companies that operate in emerging markets - where corruption risks are 
thought to be higher, according to country-level measures such as the Transparency 
International Corruption Perceptions Index - are at greater risk than companies which operate 
in more mature and less corrupt markets.  Many pharmaceutical companies are global, but 
most see emerging markets – particularly in Asia and Africa - as their most important targets 
for future growth.  
Pharmaceutical companies seeking to protect themselves against the risks associated 
with anti-bribery laws and with operating in corruption-prone environments have typically 
responded by introducing anti-bribery and corruption (ABAC) programmes. This reflects the 
legal approach taken by major prosecuting authorities, whereby they offer to treat companies 
that have violated anti-bribery laws leniently if they can demonstrate that they had adequate 
procedures in place to prevent bribery. Such programmes tend to include policies regarding 
gifts, training, political and charitable contributions, reporting lines and governance processes 
for authorising payments, requirements of due diligence on partners, and accounting policies 
regarding the proper recording of transactions.  
Companies that wish to identify themselves as being exceptionally committed to 
avoiding bribery and corruption tend also to utilise third-party certification mechanisms to 
demonstrate their resolve.  For example, many multinational pharmaceutical companies have 
signed up to the International Federation of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers and Association 
(IFPMA) Code of Practice.  IFPMA is a global, non-profit organization with a mission to 
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promote and support principles of ethical conduct and practices voluntarily in 
pharmaceutical industry. In the last decade, its code has been frequently updated, with 
reforms primarily intended to raise standards around the interactions between pharmaceutical 
companies and healthcare providers, particularly regarding marketing practices (Francer et 
al., 2014). For instance, in the 2006 update, the Code incorporated strict rules relating to 
company-hosted activities and tightened rules affecting gifts and hospitality; in the 2012 
revisions, fees for services and clinical research transparency were addressed (Francer et al., 
2014). Following such revisions, many companies that are members of IFPMA have 
tightened up their policies on gifts and hospitality, imposing low limits and banning certain 
types of hospitality. Companies have, by and large, been somewhat slower to clamp down on 
practices of paying KOLs to speak at or attend training events and conferences.   
Arguably, by signing up to these agreements, pharmaceutical companies establish a 
commitment to eschewing bribery and corruption as core to their organizational purpose. 
Such voluntary self-regulation appears intended to go beyond the bare minimum of 
compliance designed to achieve ‘plausible deniability’ if an incident of bribery is revealed, 
but rather signal commitment to a grand purpose, through very public displays and symbolic 
commitments from the company leadership. For example, when Astra Zeneca announced, in 
2011, that it would no longer pay for physicians to attend international conferences and 
launched its Competitive Distinction Through Integrity policy, it was regarded as a 
courageous first-mover. AstraZeneca’s senior leadership visibly promoted the new approach 
company-wide, demonstrating strong ‘tone at the top’, which is key to ensuring that values 
are embedded in organisations and regarded as key to organisational purpose. 
  Our puzzle is the following: Many major pharmaceutical companies have adopted 
high standards and commitments to prevent bribery and corruption from occurring in their 
organisations, and yet violations of anti-bribery laws continue to emerge frequently in this 
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sector, often relating to the provision of gifts and hospitality. In some cases, companies that 
are regarded as having first-rate ABAC programmes are nonetheless found to have engaged 
in systematic bribery in certain business units or countries. Our aims therefore are to 1) 
explore why is this happening and 2) offer advice to pharmaceutical firms to mitigate this 
risk. Moreover, whilst many studies of bribery focus on particular national settings or use 
cross-country comparisons to understand organisation-level determinants of corrupt 
behaviour, this paper studies the particular tensions that arise within organisations owing to 
the international context, and particularly the legal, political, and social dimensions of that 
environment. Our evidence suggests that company ABAC policies and codes of conduct are 
often seen as unrealistic policies designed by compliance teams in head office, lacking 
purchase with commercial teams in the field.  We start by illustrating this argument with a 
prominent example. 
In July 2013, executives at UK-based pharmaceutical multinational GlaxoSmithKline 
(GSK) awoke to accusations from the Chinese Ministry of Public Security that the company 
had paid $489m in bribes to government officials, healthcare organizations, hospitals, and 
doctors.ii According to Chinese police, GSK had used ‘middlemen’, including many travel 
agencies, to channel bribes to health officials and doctors. iii  Jianyong Wang, the legal 
representative of Shanghai Linjiang International Travel Agency, admitted on national 
television that the travel agency had arranged cash payments amounting to 40,000-500,000 
yuan for GSK, commenting that, “company (GSK) regulations only allowed gifts of a 
hundred or two hundred yuan which definitely wouldn’t do”.iv These practices are alleged to 
have caused GSK’s product prices to be inflated by 20-30 per cent.v 
On 19 September 2014, after a one-day trial, the Changsha Intermediate People’s 
Court in Hunan province found GSK guilty of bribery and imposed a $490 million fine - the 
largest such penalty levied on a company in China. Mark Reilly, the head of GSK’s China 
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operations at the time, received a three-year suspended sentence and a deportation order.  
Four Chinese-national GSK defendants – Liang Hong (Head of Operations), Zhao Hongyan 
(Legal Counsel), Zhang Guowei (Head of Human Resources) and Huang Hong (Head of 
Business Development) – were also given suspended sentences. All five individuals had 
entered guilty pleas.  
GSK is a respected multinational with well-resourced legal and compliance teams, 
operating under the scrutiny of numerous regulators.  Company policy quite clearly 
prohibited bribery. The company had a Code of Conduct in place throughout the period in 
which the offences were committed.  Entitled ‘One Company One Approach’, it stated quite 
clearly,  
“The GSK attitude towards corruption in all its forms is simple: it is one of zero 
tolerance, whether committed by GSK employees, officers, complementary workforce 
or third parties acting for or on behalf of the company.”  
 
Moreover, in a separate Code of Practice for Promotions and Customer Interactions, GSK set 
out a detailed procedure regulating any sponsorship of a corporate event, conference or 
travel. GSK also had a Third Party Code of Conduct, which stated: “Third Parties shall 
conduct their business in an ethical manner and act with integrity.”  As US Attorney Thomas 
Fox commented,  
“Frankly I do not know how much clearer a company can state that we will not 
engage in bribery and corruption. But the problem for GSK seems to be that none of 
the above was effective because the company did not follow its own stated protocols 
regarding its operations in China”vi [emphasis added]. 
 
Despite these gold-standard policies, some GSK employees and agents in China appear to to 
have systematically acted in ways that contradicted these codes and policies.   
Drawing on the issues revealed by the GSK case, our focus is organizations’ systemic 
failure to embed their anti-corruption policies in business practice. GSK had a respected 
anti-corruption program and yet one of its major regional business units acted in ways that 
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systematically subverted it. Our research question therefore is: why are top-down directives 
aimed at eradicating corruption ineffective at altering on-the-ground practices within the 
organization’s business units? In investigating this research question, our aim is to extend 
findings by Fleming and Zyglidopoulos (2008, 2009) and Zyglidopoulos and Fleming (2008), 
which reveal how corruption practices escalate within a given organization and ultimately 
conquer organizations as a whole (Pinto et al., 2008) and add recommend a more nuanced 
understanding towards organizational corruption. In our paper, we expose a disconnect 
between intra-organizational groups. Specifically, we find a disjunction between senior 
managers and directors’ goal of eradicating corruption and practices shaped by a perception 
that corruption is inevitable and manageable within business units of the same organization. 
Our paper therefore focuses on the decoupling of organizational practice from statements of 
organizational purpose.   
We seek also to situate our research within a broader literature on ‘institutional 
corruption’, a term used to describe a serious form of corruption which undermines the 
greater purpose of an institution (Lessig, 2013). Within the pharmaceutical sector, the 
practice of giving gifts and hospitality to physicians is widespread, as is the provision of 
funding to medical researchers. GSK is by no means the only company to have found itself 
facing bribery cases as a result of such practices. Bribery enforcement actions also relate to 
failures to implement central anti-bribery programs. This is indicative of the existence of 
weaknesses in governance that hinder the transfer of company values into operational 
practice. We focus on the pharmaceutical sector because it acutely demonstrates the tensions 
in which we are interested: while its broader purpose of promoting healthcare is uncontested 
and it is relatively advanced in its elaboration of anti-bribery and compliance programs, the 
questions that we pose are very far from being resolved.  
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We organize our paper in three main sections. In the first, we review the literature on 
institutional corruption in international contexts and embed our research within it. In the 
second section, we present our methods and data, comprising interviews and focus groups 
with organizational actors in leading multi-national pharmaceutical companies that operate in 
emerging markets. Following a discussion of findings, the article concludes by presenting 
additional questions to inform future organizational research regarding institutional 
corruption in international business.  
Literature 
The literature on corruption in international contexts has focused on four main areas: (1) 
What does bribery and corruption in an international context look like (definition and 
measures); (2) Antecedents of bribery and corruption; (3) Outcomes of bribery and 
corruption; (4) How to prevent bribery and corruption. Research in these four areas typically 
addresses either macro contextual or institutional concepts on the one hand or micro firm or 
individual-level factors on the other. We review the literature on institutional corruption in 
international contexts with two intentions. First, we aim to position our work within the 
existing literature and second, we illustrate that our research focus (i.e. the mismatch between 
institutional / industry-wide purpose of fighting bribery and corruption and the organizational 
practice of failing to do so) is an important step in addressing tensions between macro and 
micro and unearthing tensions between the two levels of analyses.  
According to the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, bribery is ‘‘the offering, 
promising, or giving something in order to influence a public official in the execution of 
his/her official duties’’. In an international business context, bribery typically involves a firm 
from country A offering financial or nonfinancial inducements to officials of country B to 
obtain a commercial benefit (although note that we do not imply that officials never solicit 
bribes; the power dynamics vary). The reward offered in return for influence can be non-
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monetary: what is key is that it is offered with intent to influence decisions (Pacini et al. 2002 
and Becker, Hauser, and Kronthaler, 2013). Indeed, Carmichael (1995) notes that bribes can 
include not only money and other pecuniary advantages (such as scholarship for a child’s 
college education), but also non-pecuniary benefits, such as favorable publicity. These 
definitions are consonant with key anti-bribery laws, which allow a broad definition of bribes 
as “anything of value”; FCPA enforcement actions commonly concern bribes in the form of 
cars, jewellery, foreign travel, hospitality and entertainment, and even charitable donations.  
Measuring bribery and corruption is extremely problematic, owing to the secretive 
nature of bribery and the ability of those engaged in bribery to cover up their actions 
(Lancaster and Montiloa, 1997; Eigen, 2002; Svensson, 2005; Kaufman, Kraay and 
Mastruzzi, 2008). The country-level survey-based measures of corruption provided by 
Transparency International, a Berlin-based non-governmental organization, in the form of the 
Corruption Perceptions Index and Bribe Payers Index are widely used, but also 
acknowledged to be prone to systematic biases (Andersson and Heywood, 2009; Gingerich et 
al., 2015). Survey-based measures may also lack comparability across countries, owing to 
cultural differences in how bribery and corruption are defined and perceived. Indeed, such 
differences are highly pertinent to the risks facing companies: there may not be a shared view 
across cultures of what constitutes a bribe or a gift.  
In identifying the antecedents of bribery and corruption, there is widespread 
agreement that cultural factors play a significant role in how organizations behave in 
international contexts (Hofstede, 1980; Ronen and Shenkar, 1985; Morishima, 1982; Husted, 
1999). Martin et al. (2007) argue that bribery is influenced to a great extent by national 
culture. Jing and Graham (2008), Sanyal (2005), Hooker (2009), and Leisinger and Wieland 
(2015) present a nuanced way of looking at cultural differences regarding gift-giving and 
bribery. They state that “stakeholders living in different contexts have different needs and 
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expectations. The cultural dimension of this difference is often neglected”. The authors draw 
attention to the need for corporate understandings that grasp the significance of pluralism. 
Baughn, Bodie, Buchanan, Bixby (2010) and Scholtens and Dam (2007) draw attention to the 
fact there are likely to be differences not only in the ways that domestic actors and 
organizational actors perceive gifts, but also in the way that business ethics is practiced in 
different international contexts. On similar lines, there are also other authors that help readers 
understand differing cultural practices in international contexts. For instance, Millington, 
Eberhardt, and Wilkinson (2005), Smart and Hsu (2007), and Ho and Redfern (2010) give 
detailed descriptions of “Guanxi” in Far East Asian cultures while Meyer, Boness, and Louw 
(2008) do the same for the traditional practice of “Ubuntu” in some African cultures. Taking 
a less detailed and more categorical view, Nie (2011) gives a useful and detailed comparison 
of the collectivist Chinese, Korean, an Japanese cultures versus the more individualistic 
Western ones and Vorley and Williams (2005) give a detailed account of how entrepreneurs 
gain access to capital in Bulgaria and Romania. Collectively, these authors draw attention to 
the areas and issues where sensitive reflection is advised to understand how cultural norms 
might alter business practices.  
Another antecedent is the level of overall corruption in the host country. In certain 
countries, business transactions can rarely be initiated or completed without paying bribes 
and the vast majority of bribes paid by multinationals are to government officials (Luo, 
2005). Therefore, organizations operating in multinational settings where government 
corruption is widespread are likely to engage in bribe giving (Schleifer and Vishny, 1993; 
Svensson, 2003; Teisman, 2007). In addition, domestic or foreign firms desperate for 
business may resort to such practices (Sanyal, 2005). Furthermore, if bribery is perceived as 
common practice, it may not be perceived as morally wrong because “everybody does it” 
(Sanyal, 2005).  
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Studies also demonstrate that inadequate legal frameworks in the host country (Cragg 
and Woof, 2002; Andelman, 1998; Rodriguez, Uhlenbruck, and Eden, 2005; Doh et al. 2003; 
Lee, Oh, and Eden, 2010) are associated with bribes because individuals and firms in such 
contexts have opportunities to “influence the performance of a public function” (Martin, 
1999). In some cases, unreasonably high taxes, customs duties, and strict government 
regulations that favor domestic firms provide incentives for bribery (Djankov et al., 2002) as 
a way to lower the costs of doing business (Besley and McLaren, 1993; Rijckegham and 
Weder, 1997). There may also be country-specific circumstances such as political, economic, 
and social changes, as witnessed in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union following 
the end of the Communist system, that may act as antecedents to corrupt practices (Theobald, 
1990). In transition economies, access to public resources such as credit may be determined 
by the amount of bribes firms pay to government officials because these economies lack 
infrastructure and adequate laws and therefore governments still have control over valuable 
resources (Barth et al., 2009; Olken and Barron, 2007). For Asian companies, factors such as 
fierce market competition, corrupt courts, convoluted licensing requirements, nontransparent 
interpretation of laws and regulations, inefficient official government services, and high taxes 
were identified as factors associated with corruption (Wu, 2009).  
At the organizational level, antecedents of bribery and corruption include micro 
behavioral factors such as blind spots (Bazerman and Tenbrunsel, 2011), bounded ethicality 
(Simon, 1959; Kahneman, 2011), framing (Druckman, 2011), individual perceptions 
regarding how ethical it is to pay bribes (Bernardi, Witek, and Melton, 2009), groupthink, 
conflicts of interests (Janis, 1982), and plenty of other behavioral, psychological, and social 
factors (World Bank, 2015). The firm itself may have external contextual characteristics that 
make it vulnerable to bribery such as small size, low growth rate (Wu, 2009) and internal 
factors such as top management team characteristics (Collins, Uhlenbruck, and Rodriguez, 
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2009) and inadequate corporate governance (Wu, 2009). Alternatively, a firm may be 
proactive in bribing in order to acquire preferential treatment (Bertrand et al., 2007; Lee et 
al., 2010; Svensson, 2005; Martin et al., 2007; Rose-Ackerman, 1997). Firms’ main 
motivations in doing so may include seeking access to privileged information (Porta and 
Vannucci, 1999), credit and other public resources (Barth et al., 2009), relief from heavy 
regulations and red tape (Rose-Ackerman, 1999), or speedy access to operating permits in 
highly regulated markets with tight government control (Djankov et al., 2002). From the 
perspective of firms that are seeking to gain advantage through corrupt practices, these 
practices are rent-seeking (Krueger, 1974; Tullock, 1996; Bardhan, 1997) and bribery is a 
quick and effective strategic instrument (Luo, 2005). 
As multinational businesses increasingly find themselves encountering issues 
associated with bribery and corruption, literature focusing on the outcomes of corruption has 
also flourished. While some authors have focused on strategic outcomes associated with 
bribery and corruption in international contexts (see for instance Robertson and Watson, 
2004; Troy et al., 2011; Spencer and Gomez, 2011; Jeong and Weiner, 2012), others have 
pursued research in business ethics (for example Zekos, 2004; Sanyal, 2005; Pelletier and 
Bligh, 2008; Brown and Mitchell, 2010; Ho and Redfern, 2010).  
Bribery adds to the costs of operating abroad (Nichols, 2012) and can eventually 
become so costly or risky that withdrawal from the foreign country becomes more attractive 
(Cuervo-Cazurra, 2008; Carmichael, 1995). On an annual basis, bribes amount to three 
percent of the world’s economy and can amount to up to twenty per cent of tax on 
international trade (Feinstein, Holden, and Pace, 2010). Bribery can act as a hindrance to 
economic development especially in developing countries as just over five per cent of all 
exports to developing countries are soaked up by corrupt international trade officials (Mauro, 
1997). In addition to causing financial harm, bribery and corruption have serious social 
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consequences such as posing as a threat to stability of societies and undermining democratic 
values (Lambsdorff, 1999; Mauro, 1995).  
At the firm level, there are tangible negative consequences associated with bribery 
and corruption such as inefficient allocation of limited, rare, and valuable organizational 
resources (Argandona, 2007). There may also be equally harmful yet less visible negative 
outcomes such as challenges to governance (Jorge and Basch, 2013) and unfavorable 
reputational outcomes (Campbell, 2003). For instance, if an action is viewed as unethical by 
the public, it can harm an organization’s legitimacy even if that action was legal (Campbell, 
2003).  
With so many harmful outcomes, it is unsurprising that there has been a plethora of 
articles published on measures that organizations can take to prevent corrupt practices (e.g., 
Ashforth and Anand, 2003; Anand et al., 2005; Uhlenbruck et al., 2006; Ashforth et al., 
2008; Pinto et al., 2008; Lange, 2008; Misangyi et al., 2008; Umphress and Bingham, 2011). 
In addition to seeking to comply with proliferating anti-bribery laws, authors have suggested 
voluntary corporate implementation of normative solutions (Schwartz, 2009). At the more 
micro level, many scholars argue that achieving organizations can best protect themselves 
from corruption risk through building a robust anti-corruption corporate culture. While 
Donaldson (1996) argues that multinational organizations must create a global integrity 
culture that rewards ethical behavior, Leisinger and Wieland (2015) support this by arguing 
for a corporate effort to build global values. Others suggest establishing a code of ethics 
(McKinney and Moore, 2008) or codes of conduct to ensure ethical business practices 
(Gordon and Miyake, 2001). Carroll (1993) argues that such an organizational culture 
depends on the organizational actors’ capabilities of dealing with guidelines and codes that 
require responsibility. Building on Carroll’s work, Werhane and Moriarty (2009) argue that 
the most effective organizational actors are those that can translate codes and guidelines on 
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bribery and corruption into operational practice – especially ones that are open to 
interpretation. Organizational actors that are able to implement and adopt these guidelines in 
culturally acceptable ways are described as having “moral imagination” (Werhane and 
Moriarty, 2009). Ideally, managers of multinationals should have the capabilities to act as 
“situation ethicists” (Fletcher, 1996); leaders also require equally abstract skills such as 
“ethical musicality”, “cultural sensitivity”, and “societal intelligence and competence” 
(Leisinger, 2015).   
While managerial and leadership qualities are of great importance to preventing 
bribery and corruption, some authors focus on putting preventive governance measures into 
place. Using supporting evidence regarding how corruption payments made by foreign 
subsidiaries was considered ordinary and necessary to business (Pacini et al., 2002) and that 
these payments were tax-deductible (Richers and Weber, 2013), Hauser and Hogenacker 
(2013) have argued that organizational practices play an important role in preventing bribery 
and corruption. Taking the case of Switzerland, the authors argue that multinational firms are 
not proactive about taking measures to avoid bribery and corruption and instead, the great 
majority of multinational firms tend to address corruption-related issues only in their 
international divisions and only when they are confronted with the issue. Similarly, Elango, 
Paul, Kundu, and Paudel (2010) advise organizations to be proactive and suggest putting in 
place governance mechanisms to enhance ethical congruence. Furthermore, some authors 
find that attitudes towards corruption in the home country play a significant role in propensity 
to bribe (Barr and Serra, 2009; 2010). Baughn, Bodies, Buchanan, Bixby (2010) argue that 
propensity to bribe is lowest when corruption is not tolerated in multinational firms’ home 
countries, when the firms’ countries are signatories of the OECD anti-bribery convention, 
and when those countries trade heavily with wealthier nations.  




 Management scholarship has lagged other disciplines, such as political science, 
economics, and law in its attention to corruption. Until recently, most management research 
in this area focused on individuals and negative behaviours that might or might not be 
considered corrupt. Examples of the main areas of research focus are unethical behaviour, 
antisocial behaviour, dysfunctional deviance, organizational misbehaviour, and 
counterproductive work behaviour (e.g., Bennett and Robinson, 2003; Marcus and Schuler, 
2004; Treviño, Weaver, and Reynolds, 2006).  
 Interest in the issue of corruption in organizations increased as a topic of scholarly 
interest in the aftermath of the 2001-2002 scandals at corporate giants Enron, WorldCom, and 
Tyco. Misconduct in these cases occurred within the organizations, mainly constituting fraud 
and embezzlement. Bribery, by contrast, represents an exchange between a company, or one 
of its employees, and an external actor. The external actor can be another company, but is 
more commonly a public official, who provides access to special treatment – for example, 
providing a license despite a company’s failure to meet the relevant criteria, or granting 
preferential treatment to a company that bids for a government contract - in return for the 
bribe.  
In a 2008 special topic forum on organizational corruption in the Academy of 
Management Review, the guest editors called on scholars to adopt lenses for researching 
corrupt behaviour that delve beyond the more common micro perspective to engage different 
levels of analysis, more systemic perspectives, historical renderings, and research into 
causation - what they termed the macro, wide, long, and deep views (Ashforth et al, 2008). 
However, its articles focused largely on misconduct within organizations. One article 
developed a typology of corruption that distinguished between corrupt individuals and 
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corrupt collectives within organizations (Pinto, Leana, and Pil, 2008) and the other three 
articles focused on controlling or ending corruption (Lange, 2008; Misangyi, Weaver, and 
Elms, 2008; Pfarrer, DeCelles, Smith, and Taylor, 2008).  
Research since the Academy of Management Review special topic forum has 
examined processes of corruption normalization (Palmer, 2008; Spicer, 2009), sources and 
processes of organizational diffusion and escalation (Fleming and Zyglidopoulos, 2009; 
Fleming and Zyglidopoulos, 2008; Zyglidopoulos and Fleming, 2008; Pinto et al., 2008), and 
corruption’s causes and outcomes (Greve et al., 2010; Palazzo et al., 2012; Zyglidopoulos, 
2016).  
This focus on how corruption manifests within the organization has often led the 
management literature to overlook the broader context and, particularly, the role played by 
companies in corrupting external actors in order to gain a business advantage. It is the latter 
kind of corruption that is the focus of anti-bribery laws, such as the FCPA and its similar 
counterparts in other countries, including the UK Bribery Act. As such, companies often 
address this kind of corruption risk as a matter of legal compliance. The link between 
corruption within the organization and the corruption by companies of external actors (or at 
least, their complicity in corrupt acts involving external actors) is underexplored. This 
missing link is the focus of our paper. In focusing on this, we argue that corrupt behaviour 
cannot be understood without understanding political and social factors in the external 
environment, and how this context interacts with the organizational culture. Change in the 
external environment can therefore create new corruption risks for international business that 
require an organizational response. 
Recent years have seen a greater willingness to address the impact of organizational 
corruption on the economy, with some scholars arguing that corruption was an important 
contributor to the global financial crisis of 2008 (Lounsbury and Hirsch, 2010). Such 
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arguments echo an emerging discussion in political science, which focuses on forms of 
corruption that are systemic rather than opportunistic, and whose impact may threaten to 
undermine the very purpose of the institution.   
Writing about ethics in the U.S. Congress in the early 1990s, political scientist Dennis 
F. Thompson argued that ‘institutional corruption’ need not be motivated by individual gain 
(1993). Indeed, it sometimes involved forms of conduct that were, in certain conditions, a 
necessary or desirable part of public office. However, this conduct could become problematic 
when it undermined the role or purpose of the institutions. Thus, when a Member of Congress 
accepts a political donation while doing a favour for the donor, the act is only institutionally 
corrupt if the favour has the effect of undermining political competition or undermining the 
democratic process. Laurence Lessig has developed this idea further in his rendering that if a 
campaign contribution to an elected judge results in that judge acting less objectively, the 
practice is corrupt, no matter the motives of the donors (2011).  
  We apply the concept of institutional corruption, defined as “widespread or systemic 
practices, usually legal, that undermine an institution’s objectives or integrity” (Rodwin, 
2013a, p. 544) to the study of international business. This type of corruption deviates from 
more common definitions that view corruption as an outcome solely of self-interested misuse 
of authority (Anand, Ashforth, and Joshi, 2004; Clarke, 1983; Williams, 2000; Bratsis, 2003). 
In politics, institutional corruption might be the outcome of activity designed to further a 
political party’s chances of winning an election; in business, the lending practices of banks 
prior to the financial crisis might qualify. 
In the example of GSK, the company faced charges over its practices in China, but 
GSK is one of many in the pharmaceutical industry that engaged in similar practices. In fact, 
these attempts to influence practitioners’ choices using ‘gifts’ are endemic to the industry, 
and represent only one of a much wider range of tactics used to promote pharmaceutical 
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products. These practices have recently been defined as institutional corruption in a special 
issue of the Journal of Law, Medicine, and Ethics in 2013. The papers in the special issue 
discuss a multitude of ways in which pharmaceutical companies seek to influence 
practitioners to authenticate, approve, prescribe and promote their products, addressing 
systemic problems (Jorgensen, 2013; Gagnon, 2013; Rodwin, 2013c; Light, Lexchin, and 
Darrow, 2013), funding medical research (Brown, 2013; Feldman, Gauthier, and Schuler, 
2013; Gray, 2013), shaping medical knowledge and practice (Sismondo, 2013; Cosgrove and 
Wheeler, 2013, Rodwin, 2013b), supporting patient advocacy organizations (Rose, 2013), 
and through marketing (Sah and Fugh-Berman, 2013; Landa and Elliott, 2013). As the editor 
argued:  
“…due to institutional corruption in (the pharmaceutical) industry, practitioners may 
think they are using reliable information to engage in sound medical practice, while 
they are actually relying on misleading information; they may then prescribe drugs 
that are unnecessary or harmful to patients, or more costly than equivalent 
medications” (Rodwin 2013a: p. 544).  
 
The special issue paints a shocking portrait not only of how the pharmaceutical sector 
has become reliant on practices that might be regarded as institutionally corrupt but also how 
relevant these issues are to managers and managerial scholars. Having an institutional 
corruption lens therefore broadens the scope and depth of the relevant debates by linking the 
study of corruption within organizations to the study of corporate bribery of external actors. 
Furthermore, the concept of institutional corruption can help us to re-assess common 
corporate practices and how they might undermine organizational values or ‘purpose’, an 
emerging area of interest in organizational research (Donaldson and Walsh, 2015; Hendersen 
and Van den Steen, 2015; Hollensbee, Wookey, Hickey, George, Nichols, 2014; Adler, 2014; 
Grant, 2012).  
In terms of prescriptive outcomes, drawing on insights laid out by the institutional 
corruption literature helps us consider the organizational-level challenge of implementing 
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anti-bribery and anti-corruption programs. These present internal governance problems for  
organizations when they attempt to manage corruption risks, with particular reference to 
emerging markets in China and Southeast Asia. While advice on doing business in emerging 
markets often emphasises the need for ‘local knowledge’ of institutions and culture, the 
regulation of international business activity is increasingly global (Vogel 2005; Buthe and 
Mattli, 2011). This creates legal and reputational risks for multinationals operating in 
emerging markets - where corruption risks are higher, and thus increasingly strict anti-bribery 
laws and international business norms often clash with local norms.   
 
Methods 
The study design used in this research rests on the belief that, “the social world is already 
interpreted before the social scientist arrives” (Blaikie, 2000: 36). As such, we sought to 
interpret the interpretations of the study’s participants, relying “as much as possible on the 
participants’ view of the situation being studied” (Creswell, 2003: 8). A qualitative approach 
is suitable for research that has as its goal understanding the world from the perspective of 
those studied (Pratt, 2009: 856). We therefore follow a case study approach (Yin, 2009).  
The pharmaceutical industry can be said to provide an ‘extreme case’ for the study of 
corruption and bribery. Extreme cases are valuable for unveiling insights that may be difficult 
to discern in ordinary conditions (Bamberger and Pratt, 2010; Creed, DeJordy, and Lok, 
2010; Eisenhardt, 1989). There are multiple reasons for considering the pharmaceutical 
industry an extreme case for gaining understanding of these topics, which we elucidate in the 
following paragraphs.  
Although the evidence suggests that pharmaceutical companies have been making 
payments to physicians in exchange for prescribing or promoting their products for some 
time and in many markets, these practices have attracted attention from law enforcement 
 21 
authorities for only a short time.  The legal framework prohibiting bribery in international 
business has been developed only relatively recently, and enforcement lagged behind for 
many years.   
The introduction of the UK’s Anti-Bribery Act provided the impetus for this study. 
Particularly given that most pharmaceutical companies are multinationals that would already 
be subject to US FCPA liability, our expectation as we began data collection was that the 
industry would have a well-developed compliance function and thus would be well prepared 
for the new restrictions in the UK. Thus, the tensions revealed in our interviews and focus 
groups were a surprising and interesting finding.  
 
Data Collection and Analysis 
For our study, as recommended by Yin (2009), in order to provide greater reassurance that 
study findings are representative, we relied on two different types of data, interviews and 
focus groups. These methods are complementary and help us achieve a better understanding 
of the tensions inherent in our participants’ work lives (Hesse-Biber and Leavy, 2006). We 
conducted 14 in-depth, semi-structured, face-to-face interviews with eight managers and six 
senior managers. All interviews were transcribed verbatim by a professional service prior to 
analysis.  
We carried out our data collection in three phases, targeting two different levels of 
pharmaceutical company employees. These three phases occurred in the following order: i) 
interviews with senior managers/board of directors based in the United Kingdom at the time 
of the introduction of the United Kingdom Bribery Act; followed by, ii) a focus group of 
compliance directors responsible for the Europe, Middle East and North Africa regions; and 
finally, iii) a second round of interviews with managers of the same companies working on 
the ground in Asia. These last two data sources provided the perspective of employees 
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working in cultures where the local norms and expectations include gift-giving as part of 
doing business, employees now responsible for complying with the ABAC policies set by the 
elites interviewed in the initial phase. Thus we heard from a variety of voices with multiple 
perspectives, both in terms of their organizational roles and their geographic work 
environments. More detailed accounts of these three phases follow. 
First, in 2011, the first author conducted individual interviews with senior executives 
in anti-bribery compliance, legal counsel, and marketing departments in leading multi-
national pharmaceutical companies operating in the UK. The compliance function is 
generally based in corporate headquarters, so these interviewees were elite managers. 
Gaining access to these types of elite managers can be difficult (Thomas, 1993). However, 
elite sources are appropriate in this case, both because they were the people responsible for 
setting policy regarding bribery and corruption for their organizations, and because more 
generally elites tend to have privileged access to information and thus can bring a ‘big 
picture’ perspective that other interviewees may not (Marshall and Rossman, 1999). 
The interviews were on average an hour long and followed a simple protocol 
structured around issues associated with corruption within the pharmaceutical industry and 
responses to anti-bribery laws. Interviewing people about corruption requires a nuanced 
approach; asking direct questions is generally not productive, since people are not likely to 
admit to wrongdoing. We therefore asked interviewees about ‘corruption risks’, 
vulnerabilities in the system, and how ‘people in their positions’ might behave. The initial 
interviews were selected through a purposive sampling process (Lincoln and Guba, 1985). 
Our intent was to gather a broad horizontal sample of senior managers and directors. Having 
gained access to those initial interviewees, we were able to use a purposive snowballing 
technique to increase our pool (Miles and Huberman, 1994) by asking participants at the 
conclusion of their interviews to recommend other potential interviewees.  
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Based on the initial findings from that first phase of interviews, the first author 
conducted a focus group with fifteen pharmaceutical compliance directors responsible for 
business units located in Europe, the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). This focus 
group was held at a one-day seminar of a professional association of pharmaceutical 
compliance directors. A variety of companies were represented, including Eli Lilly and 
Johnson and Johnson. The aim of the focus group was to test initial findings and to get the 
perspective of people working in one of the emerging markets (Africa) considered most 
attractive by pharmaceutical companies. The first author presented the preliminary findings 
and gathered feedback from participants, taking detailed notes on their comments.  
Finally, the fourth author conducted a final round of interviews with managers in 
health care compliance and commercial departments in Asia, three years after the UK Bribery 
Act came into effect.   
By including both very elite managers based in Western headquarters, and 
commercial managers working at the ‘coalface’ in emerging markets, we were able to hear 
the perspectives of those involved in setting ABAC policy at the highest levels of the 
organization as well as those working ‘on the ground’. The latter group, people charged with 
meeting marketing and sales targets, frequently faced pressures that put them in conflict with 
those organizational policies set at the top. At this point in the data collection, we had 
reached the point of theoretical saturation, that is, we were hearing similar stories and themes 
from each new interaction (Glaser and Strauss, 1967). Table 2 summarizes our interview 
sources.  
Insert Table 2 
We used an inductive, open-ended strategy in analysing the data. The collected data 
were broken apart and analysed. We iterated back and forth between data and literature, and 
gradually began to develop theory (Locke, 2001). Relying on theoretical memoranda (Martin 
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and Turner, 1986: 151-153) and reflexivity, we gradually refined our research questions and 
sorted the data into discrete categories of meaning. This was a process of gradual abstraction, 
as we structured our raw data into categories, linked those categories to themes, and 
reassembled them into our theoretical framework (Pratt, Rockmann, and Kaufmann, 2006).  
To provide one example of how we moved from first-order concepts to second-order 
ones, we heard these words from one of our interviewees:  
“It’s a tradition in Asian countries for gift giving. For example, it is very rampant 
during Christmas season that local companies offer gifts to the doctors, key 
customers, key suppliers.” 
 
It was apparent that those working in emerging markets were concerned that by not giving 
gifts they risked severing the critical relationship between healthcare providers and sales 
representatives. As we examined the data, we found many similar types of statements, which 
we gradually came to recognize as evidence of a tension between global laws and local 
norms. Similarly, we began to recognize a pattern of conflicting aims between those charged 
with ensuring compliance with organizational statements of purpose around corruption and 
bribery and those in the trenches who were expected to balance the demands from the top for 
adherence to new ethical standards with their often more compelling requirements to achieve 
commercial targets. Thus, the data provided evidence that two tensions exist that are difficult 
to resolve: that between global laws and local norms, and another pitting compliance goals 
against commercial ones. 
Findings 
Our goal is to investigate the disconnect between the institutional purpose of combating 
bribery and corruption and organizational practices that consistently fail to do so in the 
pharmaceutical industry. Our findings point to two significant tensions that are likely to be 
associated with and contributing to this disconnect: 1) The tension between global laws (that 
prohibit bribery and corruption, and may regard gifts and hospitality as equivalent to bribes) 
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and local norms (that regard bribery – or at least gift-giving -as acceptable); 2) The 
misalignment of the objectives of the compliance departments (that advocate engaging in 
practices aimed at combating bribery and corruption) and the commercial departments (that 
are driven by, and rewarded for, the volume of sales they undertake). We discuss these two 
tensions in detail below. 
Global laws, local norms: a complex external environment 
Under the FCPA, and most national bribery laws in OECD ABC-signatory countries, 
companies can be held liable for payments made by their employees or agents.  This creates a 
tension, particularly in countries where corrupt business practices are the norm and where 
gifts and hospitality are regarded as key tools for building business relationships. Yet there 
are commercial pressures to operate in just such areas: the main growth opportunities for 
international pharmaceutical companies in the coming years are in emerging markets, 
particularly Asia and Africa.  For most companies, the challenge is how to operate in these 
markets without falling foul of the law.  
In such markets, the relationship between the sales team and the healthcare provider – 
physicians or hospital directors - remains critical to sales, and healthcare providers often 
expect to be given gifts or provided with hospitality.  To cease such practices would not only 
risk insulting an individual, but could also lead to the loss of business – particularly if 
competitors continue to engage in such practices.  One interview respondent told us, 
“It’s a tradition in Asian countries for gift giving. For example, it is very rampant 
during Christmas season that local companies offer gifts to the doctors, key 
customers, key suppliers.” 
 
“I’ve heard stories that MRs, in local companies could give valuable gifts such as 
phones, tablets, which can be interpreted as bribery already.” 
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In an environment where corruption is endemic, companies may find it difficult to 
discern legitimate from corrupt motives.  One respondent recounted the kind of difficulty that 
might arise:  
“the regulator or the guy in the Indian Ministry of Health, can just say, oh, you know, 
the head of the agency requires a trial to be done locally, which is fair enough, and he 
suggests that you use so-and-so, who might be his brother-in-law or…whatever.  
Now, you could genuinely have a situation where there is a very good clinic …or it 
may be just his best friend who he wants to, you know, generate some business for.” 
 
Thus, a company might think that it is making a legitimate payment for a clinical trial, 
but could find that this payment will be regarded as a bribe if it has not carried out adequate 
due diligence on the third party. 
The corruption risks in emerging markets may be exacerbated because pharmaceutical 
companies tend to rely on third parties with ‘local knowledge’, whose conduct may be more 
difficult to monitor and control. One respondent told us, 
“[We were] very often operating through agents because, like anything else operating 
in a foreign country, there are people who know the right people to approach and get 
you the right contacts and all that.”  
 
However, this makes it difficult to assess whether the agent has internalised company 
norms and policies or might rather be pursuing a different agenda.   
Another problem is that the local companies with which MNCs compete are not 
always bound by international laws or norms, creating competitive pressure to behave in line 
with local traditions.   
“There should be a legitimate purpose for sending doctors to a congress event. But 
local companies do not have that restriction. So of course tit for tat, doctors that 
receive such hospitality prescribe the drugs that those local companies manufacture.” 
 
Our interviews further suggest that even the most honourably intentioned 
multinationals must grapple with the fact that there may be local expectations – among 
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physicians, regulators or potential business partners – that the company will pay bribes or 
provide excessive hospitality.  
Therefore, using our data, we identify the following factors as contributing to the 
tension between global laws and local norms: perceived risk of harming relationships, perceived 
demand for gifts, perceived risk of individual insult, perceived risk of losing future business, 
perceived understanding that it is “common practice” and necessary in order to compete, difficulty in 
separating legitimate and corrupt practices, challenges in monitoring motives and activities of local 
agents, domestic competitors are not governed by international anti-bribery and corruption laws. 
Table 3 illustrates these in detail, giving explanations of each and providing evidence from 
our data to support each category. 
Insert Table 3 
Compliance versus commercial: An internal culture clash 
The compliance and legal teams in multinational pharmaceutical companies tend to be large, 
and well-resourced relative to many other sectors, reflecting the heavy regulatory burden in 
such a complex and sensitive industry.  Corporate policies on ethics and legal compliance are 
often well advanced and, although the anti-corruption and bribery element represents only 
one element, it is typically regarded as being of central importance by the compliance team. 
However, several companies that have faced FCPA enforcement actions because their 
employees paid bribes had had exemplary anti-bribery and corruption programs in place, yet 
this had not prevented the misconduct.   
Our interview evidence suggests that individuals operating in high-corruption 
contexts often fail to internalise the values set out in codes of conduct and anti-bribery 
policies. Compliance teams are often unaware of the pressures on sales and marketing teams, 
while the latter often regard compliance as an unhelpful and unnecessary constraint on their 
core activities.  Although both compliance and commercial have an interest in the company’s 
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long-term performance, their short-term objectives might conflict. The compliance team is 
concerned with avoiding risk, while the sales team wants to maximise sales - and their 
salaries or bonuses may depend on it. One sales executive told us, 
“In the eyes of the stock market and the financial markets, if you don’t hit your 
numbers, you’re dead.  There are no prizes for being the most honest company.” 
 
These conflicts are typically latent, with commercial teams ‘paying lip-service’ to 
compliance advice provided in training sessions, for example. Several compliance directors 
recounted their experiences of providing anti-bribery training to rooms full of glazed 
expressions: 
“in the [training sessions] where you haven’t had a lot of feedback, you wondered if 
they were listening politely because they had to and, actually, as soon as the guy from 
Headquarters has gone, it’s, you know, back to the normal way of doing business.”  
 
Some were also sympathetic, aware that the company policy was unrealistic in a 
particular local context: 
“I can understand, you know, if they’re living in…Brazil or in Indonesia, where pretty 
much everything is corrupt, then you’re asking a hell of a lot of them.”  
 
The sales professionals that we interviewed also noted that the pressure from 
compliance is weak, particularly compared to the pressure to deliver sales. Where their pay or 
promotion prospects depend on meeting sales targets, such concerns are likely to dominate 
any appeals to change their practices. Arguably, achieving compliance in such situations 
requires a more fundamental re-thinking of organizations’ business model and remuneration 
practices. 
The difficulty of getting the message across was seen as a problem not just with 
employees, but also with local agents, despite efforts to set out firm rules in their contracts. 
“They will sign that document, in some cases knowing that they cannot abide by it. 
They sign it because they need the business but doing business in the correct way 
would make it ‘no go’.”  
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Where the conflicts become more overt, compliance professionals often bemoan the 
absence of ‘tone at the top’, arguing that their training would have more force if the 
company’s directors and Board were more vocal about the need to avoid corrupt practices. 
In sum, we identify the following as contributors to the tension between compliance 
and commercial teams: conflicting short-term goals, lack of commitment, perception of unrealistic 
company anti-corruption policies, perceived mismatch of weight placed on compliance versus sales, 
and challenge of communicating the significance of anti-bribery compliance to local agents. Once 




The concept of institutional corruption is of particular interest because of the importance it 
places on an institution’s underlying purpose. This fits with emerging interest in the 
management literature on organizational purpose which, following Selznick (1957), 
Henderson and Van den Steen (2015) define as “a concrete goal or objective for the firm that 
reaches beyond profit maximization” (Henderson and Van den Steen, 2015). Recently, 
intellectual questions such as “why do so many firms publicly espouse a ‘purpose’ beyond 
simple profit maximization?” and “why do so many managers and employees appear to care 
deeply about this purpose and to believe that it is critically important?” are being posed. 
Henderson and Van den Steen cite the case of consumer goods giant Unilever, which “has 
committed to obtaining 100 percent of its agricultural inputs from sustainable sources by 
2020, while Henry Schein, a distributor of medical and dental products, claims that one of its 
most important goals is the ‘expansion of care to at-risk groups’. Both firms appear to believe 
that purpose is critical to their success, even though it seems to imply significant costs 
without obvious commensurate gains”. Henderson and Van den Steen thus note that the 
broader purpose of a company can conflict with other aims such as profit maximisation, 
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although other scholars might situate purpose within the literature on corporate social 
responsibility, some of which suggests that ‘doing good’ is equivalent to ‘doing well’ 
(Hollensbe et al., 2014). 
For an individual company, however, this might come into conflict with other aims, 
such as the company’s duty to its shareholders to maximise profit. Moreover, some scholars 
have noted that the potential for pharmaceutical companies to alleviate suffering may impose 
specific ethical obligations or, at the very least, make them subject to political and social 
pressures that affect their ‘licence to operate’ (Kapstein and Busby, 2013).  
Institutional corruption negatively affects an organization’s effectiveness by 
threatening its ability to fulfil its purpose (Lessig, 2013a). As demonstrated by the GSK 
example, at the very least the company’s actions resulted in significantly higher costs for 
patients. The greater risk is that companies’ ‘gifts’ to healthcare officials and doctors 
influence the way in which they treat patients. Besides making medicines more costly, these 
gift-giving practices may lead to unnecessary prescriptions with the potential even to cause 
harm to patients (Rodwin, 2013a).  
To be institutionally corrupt, such practices need not render an organization unable to 
fulfil its purpose. It might be sufficient that such practices make purposeful outcomes 
uncertain. In either case, the failure to fulfil organizational purpose or the uncertainty about 
whether it is fulfilled is likely to erode public trust in the organization and the sector. Just as a 
politician might lose objectivity due to a campaign contribution, so might a physician who 
has received gifts from a pharmaceutical company lose objectivity when prescribing drugs, 
interpreting the results of clinical trials, or advising a regulator. This is an important risk for a 
pharmaceutical company; in the eyes of the public, the purpose of the industry is less about 
profitability than it is about advancing human health; if it is seen to obstruct that purpose, it 
could have serious consequences in terms of public trust and ‘license to operate’.  
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 Despite the overarching purpose of pharmaceutical organizations to save lives and to 
do so in ways that is in the best interest of the public, corrupt practices are rife in the 
pharmaceutical sector. This may reflect a structural difficulty for pharmaceutical companies. 
Because of the nature of their products, regulators usually prevent pharmaceutical companies 
– to varying degrees – from reaching out directly to their potential customers.  Rather, 
pharmaceutical companies gain access to markets through a variety of intermediaries, 
including regulators (e.g., agencies that monitor drug safety) and healthcare providers (e.g., 
hospitals or physicians who prescribe drugs to patients).  Because physicians often represent 
an important nexus between the company and the purchasers and/or end-users of medical 
products (i.e. in terms of both state healthcare providers (HCPs) and patients), pharmaceutical 
companies have developed a range of marketing strategies that seek to influence physicians 
to support their products. At one end of the spectrum, relatively small payments are made to 
multiple physicians to influence them to prescribe a company’s products.  At the other end, 
larger payments are made to a much smaller number of physicians and medical researchers to 
act as ‘key opinion leaders’, influencing other physicians in their field, and potentially to 
advising regulatory agencies on the safety and efficacy of certain drugs (Sismondo, 2013).    
Research suggests that these practices are by no means restricted to operations in 
emerging markets (Oldani, 2004; Rodwin, 2012; European Commission, 2013).  One study 
conducted in 2007 showed that 83% of US physicians received gifts from the industry, while 
28% received payments for services such as honoraria for speaking at conferences and 
consulting fees (Campbell, 2007). The payments are not always monetary and are often 
provided under the guise of hospitality at training events and conferences – a theme familiar 
from the GSK case.   
Such payments may not be overtly provided in exchange for influence, but they seek 
to build long-term relationships of loyalty among high-status individuals with the potential to 
 32 
exert influence.  As such, they introduce conflicts of interest that may cause intermediaries to 
be biased, leading to institutional corruption (Rodwin 2013a).vii  Pharmaceutical companies 
argue, in their defence, that they rely on physicians to inform and train their peers in how to 
use new products. However, in many cases, the hospitality associated with conferences and 
training is excessive. Sah and Fugh-Berman (2013), document six psychological principles 
that pharmaceutical firms use to influence physicians and suggest that “commitment to 
ethical behaviour” cannot eliminate subconscious bias on the part of physicians.   
Our interviews confirmed that the provision of hospitality to physicians has been a 
key element of marketing strategy for many years, in developed western markets as well as 
emerging markets.  As one of our respondents explained, 
“In Western Europe and in the US, it’s the sales representatives going out to see 
doctors to detail the products to them – in other words, not to sell products to them, 
generally, but to persuade them that, when they have a patient coming in with this 
disease, ours is the best drug.  Now, what is permissible there and what is not? […] 
It’s up to us to educate the medical profession about our products.  So, you know, if 
you go off to, I don’t know, a doctor in the UK, and offer to send him to a conference 
in Sydney, where it’s going to be on this particular anti-cancer drug, he’ll be your 
friend for life, and it may well be a first rate conference, he will learn all about this, in 
his area of medicine, and it will advance his career enormously, but he may also feel 
very beholden to you, because… you’d fly him out there, you would put him up in a 
good hotel, you’d give him meals and everything.”  
 
The hospitality provided was often excessive, as one senior compliance executive 
who had worked in the pharmaceutical industry for many years recounted, 
“I blush to think, in the early ‘90s, of some of the [drug] launch parties we had…  We 
had a very flamboyant general manager, and he rounded up all the doctors he could 
lay his hands on, 250, and they were flown to some incredible resort and they had a 
weekend there of the high life.” 
 
Other respondents told similar stories, and some took the view that such treatment 
might well have served to buy the loyalty of physicians: 
“if you go off to, I don’t know, a doctor in the UK, and offer to send him to a 
conference in Sydney, where it’s going to be on this particular anti-cancer drug, he’ll 
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be your friend for life, and it may well be a first rate conference […] but he may also 
feel very beholden to you.”  
 
Most compliance professionals that we interviewed also claimed that practices had 
changed in recent years, largely as a result of public and legal scrutiny, 
“There have been a lot of stories in the press…golf was a big one…paying for doctors 
to play golf.  I remember trying to overcome that one in Canada at one stage.  It was 
just… this poor little GP [General Practitioner] out in the Midwest, he… he used to 
go out golfing with his friendly rep every week, you know, and we had to stop that.” 
 
However, our findings and cases outside of our research that such practices have not 
ceased, and may in particular be prevalent in emerging markets. The gradual phasing out of 
such practices in western markets has been driven largely by the introduction of anti-bribery 
laws, which have increased the risk that such practices will be regarded as bribes intended to 
obtain a business advantage.  
The spread of anti-bribery laws and the more active levels of enforcement have 
caused companies to take corruption risk more seriously, as evidenced by reduced investment 
by OECD companies in the most corrupt countries (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2008).  The corporate 
response to anti-bribery laws has often been to introduce an anti-bribery and corruption 
program, usually involving a risk assessment, the introduction of stricter due diligence 
procedures on partners and third parties, and the introduction of internal policies to ban or 
regulate gift-giving, entertainment and hospitality. However, our research suggests that it is 
very difficult for companies to translate policy into practice in this area.   
Our research has some practice-based outcomes for organizational actors striving to 
overcome the tensions that exist between global laws and local norms and between 
compliance and commercial departments. In terms of the tension between global laws and 
local norms, our research conveys that organizations operating in environments with strong 
traditions of gift-giving may find it difficult to win or maintain business if they cease to 
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engage in gift-giving. Under these circumstances, organizations operating in environments 
characterised with strong traditions of gift-giving are likely to find it easier to implement a no 
gifts policy if they cease to rely on local agents embedded in local norms. Regarding the 
tension between compliance and commercial departments, one of our most striking findings 
was that anti-bribery compliance programs will be ineffective in changing the behaviours of 
sales and marketing teams where the latter’s pay and promotion prospects depend on meeting 
targets. Therefore, we suggest that as a means of overcoming the tension between compliance 
and commercial departments, there needs to be strong evidence of Board-level commitment 
to anti-bribery programs and innovative ways of incentivising compliant behaviour. Also, 
achieving compliance in such situations requires a more fundamental re-thinking of 
organizations’ business model and remuneration practices – one that places equal weight on 
anti-bribery compliance and sales revenue and aims to align not only the long-term goals of 
these two departments but also the short-term ones.  
Conclusion 
Our research argues for the need to situate the study of organizational corruption within 
social, political and legal context, and to draw on concepts of corruption that have been 
elaborated in political science. The amalgamation of research on organizational corruption 
with research carried out in other theoretical fields helps us to move away from ‘corruption’ 
as a monolithic conceptual construct and instead recognise its many forms and the extent to 
which different institutional contexts vary in their vulnerability to different types of 
corruption. In particular, and at the macro level, we suggest that the concept of institutional 
corruption can help frame the new wave of interest in business practices that appear to 
undermine the broader purpose of corporate activity.   
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At the organizational level, we advocate further research to understand why 
organizations encounter difficulties in translating anti-bribery policies into changes in 
business practice on the ground. Multinational companies have thus far responded to 
changing laws and norms concerning bribery in international business largely by introducing 
centralised anti-bribery and corruption policies and seeking to improve compliance with them 
among employees and third parties. However, such initiatives often fail to recognise two 
important tensions: one between global and local standards, and another between the 
objectives of internal compliance and commercial teams. Without addressing these tensions, 
change is likely to remain superficial and companies will find that they are not adequately 
protected against the legal and reputational risks associated with corruption.  Deeper reforms 
of corporate governance may be needed to cope with the challenges that face the sector and 
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